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Article 13

CERCLA and the Abrogation of
State Sovereign Immunity
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the inception of our nation, the most serious threats
to the rights of the people have come when legislators and
judges have considered the country to be pressed with problems
so great as to require "creative interpretation" of our
constitutional rights. Today, the most urgent problems facing
our nation are the imminent dangers threatening the natural
environment in which we live.
Since the 1960's, Congress has passed act after act placing
increasingly restrictive standards and controls on the way we
treat our environment. These standards frequently collide
head-on with the guaranteed freedoms we thought were
secured by the Constitution. The Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980 (CERCLA) 1 and the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA)2 constitute a very broad
response to environmental dangers. CERCLA conflicts with the
Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution. In Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., 3 the U.S. Supreme Court's plurality decision
reopened the old wounds of the struggle between two opposing
theories of the Eleventh Amendment.
The Court must settle this interpretive battle in order to
return stability to Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. Will
the Eleventh Amendment or other constitutional provisions be
able to check the sweeping effects of environmental legislation
on the rights of the people and states? Or, will the urgent
needs of the times continue to change the way we interpret our
Constitution?

1.
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, 42 u.s.c. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
2.
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (codified in various
sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 960r-9675).
3.
491 u.s. 1 (1989).
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BRIEF HISTORY OF STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

For several hundred years the Supreme Court has
struggled over the question of state sovereign immunity. Such
a struggle is perhaps inevitable in our unique system of
federalism which attempts to balance the power of each
sovereign state with the sovereign power of the federal
government. Ratification of the Constitution made it clear that
the sovereign status of the states would be diminished,
reducing them to subsidiary sovereigns, while ultimate
authority would rest in the strong centralized national
sovereign.
The subservient status of the states toward the federal
government was not at first seen as a barrier to state sovereign
immunity. It was not until the Supreme Court began to
interpret Article III of the Constitution as an abrogation of
sovereign immunity that the debate became heated. 4
The doctrine of sovereign immunity originated with the
English courts at least as early as the thirteenth century. 5 The
doctrine was transplanted to America by the early colonists
and adopted by the several states after the revolution. By the
time the Constitution was ratified, the idea of state sovereign
immunity was widely accepted6 but not universaV Early
American rejections of the doctrine were contained in colonial
charters which expressly gave citizens the right to sue their
colonial governments. 8 Probably the most widely held view of
state sovereign immunity after the revolution was that
immunity existed unless a state gave its consent to be sued. 9
The most serious problem facing the future of the doctrine
of state sovereign immunity has been its apparent clash with
Article III of the Constitution. Article III established the basis
4.
See Letitia A. Sears, Comment, Pennsylvania v. Union Gas: Congressional
Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity Under the Commerce Clause, or, Living
With Hans, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 513, 515-16 (1989).
5.
See 9 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A History of English Law 8 (3d ed. 1944).
Sovereign immunity was widely accepted throughout the American colonies
6.
primarily due to the circulation of Blackstone's COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND. SELECTED WRITINGS OF EDMUND BURKE 126-27 (W. J. Bate ed. 1960).
7.
Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 89 (1989).
8.
ld; see also 5 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS
16, 19 (William F. Swindler ed. 1975).
9.
See 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 526-27 (Jonathan Elliot ed. 1836).
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for federal jurisdiction over the states in a number of
situations. For example, federal jurisdiction exists when there
is a controversy "between a State and citizens of another
State . . .
or foreign . . .
citizens or Subjects." 10 The
inconsistency between state sovereign immunity and Article III
has been the subject of much debate among constitutional
scholars. Traditionally, two opposing explanations of Article III
have been propounded.
Opponents of sovereign immunity usually characterize
Article III as expressing a clear intent to abrogate any notion
of state sovereign immunity that may have existed at the time
of ratification. Supporters of sovereign immunity see Article III
as merely expressing a statement of available federal
jurisdiction to be considered only in light of the existing
doctrine of state sovereign immunity. Another explanation of
Article III is that it is merely an attempt to give the federal
judiciary jurisdiction limited to those cases in which the state
is a plaintiff against a private citizen. Despite numerous
appeals to the history by both sides, no definitive explanation
of the intent behind Article III has arisen.

A.

Chisholm and the Eleventh Amendment

The debate over the meaning of Article III eventually culminated in the Supreme Court's controversial decision in
Chisholm v. Georgia. 11 The Court in Chisholm held that, in
light of express provisions in the Constitution, particularly
Article Ill, a state could be sued in federal court by a citizen of
another state. 12 Several of the Justices in Chisholm explained
that by virtue of having joined the federal union, states had
consented to be sued by private citizens in federal court because of the supremacy of the federal government over the
states. 13 Only Justice Cushing found that the states' immunity had been specifically abrogated by Article III. 14
The decision in Chisholm caused such a furor that Congress began working within days to construct a constitutional
amendment reversing the effects of the decision. 15 As a result

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

U.S. CaNST. art. III, § 2.
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
!d.
!d. at 464-65.
!d. at 467 (Cushing, J., concurring).
John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of
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of their efforts, the Eleventh Amendment was drafted, overwhelmingly ratified, and put into effect by January 8, 1798. 16
Traditionally, two explanations have been proffered for the
widespread support the Eleventh Amendment received in Congress after the Chisholm decision. One common explanation
points out that the states were under a heavy burden of debt
from foreign creditors and desired to default on those debts
without suffering any consequence. 17 The second explanation
is simply that there was an overwhelming understanding
among the framers of the Constitution that the states were
intended to be immune from citizen's s~its. 18 These differing
explanations form the basis for the current schisms in modern
Eleventh Amendment debate. Regardless of Congress' attempt
to settle the sovereign immunity question, the Eleventh
Amendment may have caused more confusion over states' sovereign immunity than did the Chisholm decision.
B.

The Eleventh Amendment
The Eleventh Amendment states that:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of
another State, or by citizens or subjects of any Foreign
State. 19

Although the wording of the amendment seems clear, it leaves
open several questions concerning state immunity. The answers
to such questions turn on what one sees as the intended purpose in passing the amendment.
On its face, the Eleventh Amendment is not a full assertion of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. It simply defines a
narrow set of circumstances in which suits against the states
Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth
Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1436 (1975).
16.
See Peter N. Swan, The Eleventh Amendment Revisited: Suits Against State
Government Entities and Their Employees in Federal Courts, 14 J. COLL. & U.L. 1,
3 (1987).
17.
Louise L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign lmmuni·
ty, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (1963); see also Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge
Comm'n., 359 U.S. 275 (1959); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 27 (1933).
18.
See CHARLES G. HAINES, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
GoVERNMENT AND POLITICS, 1789-1835 at 138 (1944); see also Hans v. Louisiana,
134 U.S. 1, 11-15 (1890).
U.S. CaNST. amend XI.
19.
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cannot be heard in federal court. The amendment makes no
mention of suits by a state's own citizens or by the federal government. Accordingly, post-amendment debate has centered on
whether the Eleventh Amendment was created (1) for the purpose of constitutionalizing the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity or (2) to eliminate a narrow class of suits between a state and a citizen of another state. Wranglings over
the breadth and limits of the Eleventh Amendment focus upon
these two questions. The faction which supports the notion that
the Eleventh Amendment establishes the traditional notions of
state sovereign immunity is called the "conventionalist" faction. 20 The faction which supports the theory that the
Eleventh Amendment should be narrowly interpreted has come
to be called the "revisionist" faction. 21

C.

The Rule in Hans v.Louisiana

Part of the debate concerning wrangling about the scope of
the Eleventh Amendment was settled by the Supreme Court in
Hans u. Louisiana. 22 The decision in Hans expanded the
Court's previous interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment23
and "adopted the traditional view that the amendment was
intended to correct the error of Chisholm" by codifying the
doctrine of state sovereign immunity. 24 Hans was a solid victory for the conventionalists. Today, Hans stands for the proposition that Eleventh Amendment protection extends to suits by
a state's own citizens as well as to those instituted by citizens
of other states. Although Hans has been widely criticized by
the revisionists as being wrongly decided, 25 it has remained
effectively in force si.pce it was handed down in 1890.

20.
See Charles J. Williamson, CERCLA, as Amended by SARA, Abrogates State
Immunity Under the Eleventh Amendment Rendering States Liable for Money
Damages in Federal Court, and Congress Has the Authority, Under the Commerce
Clause, to Enact Such Legislation: Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S.Ct 2273
(1989), 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 723, 741 (1990).
21.
!d.
22.
134 U.S. 1 (1890).
Previously, the Court had more narrowly confined the meaning of the
23.
amendment to its literal wording. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat)
316, 342 (1819).
CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
24.
110 (1972).
See Sears, supra note 4, at 519-22.
25.
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D. Abrogation and Waiver of Immunity
Although the Eleventh Amendment has survived numerous
frontal assaults, the Court has created several exceptions
which allow private parties to avoid the consequences of Hans
and obtain relief from states in federal court. 26 A state may
waive its Eleventh Amendment protection by consenting to suit
or Congress may abrogate the sovereign immunity of the states
by statute under certain provisions of the Constitution.
Waiver of sovereign immunity occurs when a state makes a
voluntary appearance and defends itself on the merits of a case
in federal court, 27 when a state passes a statute expressing its
consent to be sued, 28 or when a state continues an activity
after a federal statute is passed establishing a federal standard
for that activity. 29
Congressional abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment occurs when Congress uses its superior power to override state
immunity by passing a statute pursuant to one of its constitutional sources of power. Traditional constitutional provisions
under which the Supreme Court has recognized Congress' right
to exercise its power of abrogation are the Fourteenth Amendment,30 the Commerce Clause31 and possibly the Fifteenth
Amendment. 32
This use of Congressional override, however, has been limited by the Court. It is not enough to show that a federal statute was passed under the Fourteenth Amendment or the Commerce Clause to prove Congress' intent to override the Eleventh Amendment. The Court has recently formulated a standard which must be met in order to find that a federal statute
abrogates the Eleventh Amendment. In Atascadero State Hosp.
v. Scanlon, 33 the Court held that in order to override state

26.
The additional remedy of seeking redress from state officers is not discussed within the scope of this paper. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
27.
See Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883). But see Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651 (1974) (a state that has defended and lost on the merits may raise
an Eleventh Amendment defense on appeal).
28.
See, e.g., Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959).
29.
This type of waiver, however, may have been severely limited if not completely abolished. See Welch v. State Dep't. of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S.
468, 477 (1987); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
30.
See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
31.
32.
See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
33.
473 U.S. 234 (1985).
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sovereign immunity, "Congress may abrogate the States' constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only
by making his intention unmistakably clear in the language of
the statute."34 This standard has rarely been met.
The Court has refused to find a clear abrogation of the
Eleventh Amendment under section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act,35 the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,36 the Education to the
Handicapped Act,37 and the Bankruptcy Code. 38 However,
the Court has found a clear abrogation of the Eleventh
Amendment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,39
and more recently, under the SARA amendments of
CERCLA. 40 This recent finding of the Court makes the
CERCLA statute of more imminent concern to the states.
III. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF CERCLA
AND THE SARA AMENDMENTS
In 1980, CERCLA was enacted by Congress to address
some of the deficiencies in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA).41 The RCRA was concerned with
protecting the environment from the disposal of hazardous
substances. 42 Among the problems CERCLA was intended to
address was the need to provide a retroactive remedy for inactive hazardous waste disposal sites. 43 A recurring difficulty
with the cleanup of hazardous materials under previous law
was the fact that some of the most dangerous threats to the
welfare of the environment were created years ago when large
quantities of hazardous materials were left behind by now defunct companies. Furthermore, many of the properties on which
the hazardous materials are located have passed through several hands with the current owners having little knowledge of or

34.
!d. at 242.
35.
See Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
36.
See Atascadero, 473 U.S. 234.
See Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989).
37.
38.
See Hoffman v. Connecticut Department of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S.
96 (1989).
39.
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1.
40.
41.
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992
(1988).
James K. Floyd, Note, Piercing the Veil of Sovereign Immunity: Holding
42.
States Liable in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 35 S.D.L. REV. 341, 344-45 (1990).
43.
See H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120.
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culpability in the storage or disposal of the materials.
CERCLA certainly appeared to resolve the problem of retroactive application, 44 but the statute was plagued by other
deficiencies which limited its effectiveness. 45 In 1986, Congress passed the SARA amendments to CERCLA in order to
cure some of the statute's shortcomings by: (1) adding $8.5 billion46 to the Superfund;47 (2) allowing EPA to settle with responsible parties; 48 and (3) allowing liable parties to seek contribution from other responsible parties. 49 In addition,
CERCLA was changed in ways that may not have been obvious
until the Supreme Court's decision in Union Gas. 50

A. Liability of Persons as Owners or Operators
Central to the issue of state immunity under CERCLA is
the question of who qualifies as a "person" or as an "owner or
operator". Joint and several liability under CERCLA has been
strictly imposed upon persons who are or were owners or operators of hazardous waste vessels or facilities. Recently, the
Supreme Court has based its decisions about application of tha.
Eleventh Amendment on the issue of whether or not state governments are specifically included in these terms. If states are
"persons" or "owners or operators" under the statute then they
may be subject to potentially devastating liability.
It is apparent from CERCLA itself that strict liability, at
the very least, is implied by section 9607(a)(1). Section
9607(a)(1) states:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this
section(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,

44.
See United States v. Monsanto Co., 85R F.2d 160, 174 (4th Cir.
1988)("Congress intended CERCLA's liability provisions to apply retroactively to
pre-enactment disposal activities."); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical
& Chern. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 733 (8th Cir. 1986)("The statutory scheme itself is
overwhelmingly remedial and retroactive."); United States v. Sharon Steel Corp.,
681 F. Supp. 1492, 1495 (D. Utah 1987)("CERCLA is meant to be both remedial
and retroactive.").
45.
H.R. Rep. No. 253, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2836, 2837.
46.
The original allotment was $1.6 billion. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1)(1980).
47.
42 U.S.C. § 9611.
48.
!d. § 9622.
49.
!d. § 9613(0.
Union Gas, 409 U.S. 1.
50.
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(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such
hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise
arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous
substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other
party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or
operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous
substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities,
incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from
which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes
the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance,
shall be liable for(A) all costs of removal or remedial action ....51

The defenses referred to are limited to the following:
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee
or agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission
occurs in connection with a contractual relationship . . . if
(defendant) (a) exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions
against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party
and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such
acts or omissions .... 52

Courts have been more zealous than even the statute itself
in holding parties strictly liable for CERCLA violations. In New
York v. Shore Realty Corp., the court held:
Congress intended that responsible parties be held strictly
liable, even though an explicit provision for strict liability was
not included in the compromise. Section 9601(32) provides
that 'liability' under CERCLA 'shall be construed to be the
standard of liability' under section 311 of the Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321, which courts have held to be strict liability .... 53
51.
52.
53.

42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).

!d. § 9607(b).
759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2nd Cir. 1985) (citing Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied
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In United States v. Hooker Chemicals. & Plastics Corp., 54
the court imposed joint and several liability but stated that a
party could show that the harm was divisible. 55 From the express provisions of CERCLA as well as from the federal court
decisions one can conclude that any "person" who can be classified as an owner or operator is potentially under a great burden of liability, and thus, even greater weight is placed upon
how the courts and the statute define the terms "person" or
"owner or operator," and specifically, whether states are included in those terms.

B.

The SARA Amendments

Of the major achievements of the SARA amendments, two
have adversely affected states' sovereign immunity. The first is
in the expanded definitions that expressly and impliedly include states as potentially liable parties for hazardous waste
violations. The second is the added provision which allows for
citizens suits.

1.

SARA's new definitions

SARA's first significant expansion was an express inclusion
of states in its definition of "persons". Section 101(21) provides:
The term "person" means an individual, firm, corporation,
association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality,
commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate
body. 56

SARA also impliedly included states when it defines an "owner
or operator" as "a 'person' who engages in certain activities."57
Thus, if a state is engaged in certain illegal activities, described
by the SARA amendments, it could be held liable for damages.
The SARA amendments also contain an exclusion for states

Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609, 613 (4th Cir. 1979).
54.
680 F. Supp. 546, 549 (W.D.N.Y. 1988).
55.
United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 811 (S.D. Ohio 1983)
(If there are genuine issues of material fact concerning the divisibility of the harm
and any potential apportionment, the defendants are not entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.)
56.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (emphasis added).
57.
Floyd, supra, note 42 at 347; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).
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which applies in certain circumstances, but the wording of the
exclusion probably does more harm than good to state immunity. The exclusion provides that:
The term "owner or operator" does not include a unit of State
or local government which acquired ownership or control
involuntarily through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment, or other circumstances in which the government involuntarily acquires title by virtue of its function as a sovereign.ss

But the exclusion does not apply where the state "has caused
or contributed to the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance from (a) facility, ... "59
Further, the SARA exclusion for states contains a clause
which potentially destroys any state immunity that may have
been retained in other parts of the statute. Section 101(20)
specifies that a state "shall be subject to the provisions of this
chapter in the same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and substantively, as any nongovernmental entity,
including liability under section 9607 of this title."60 Thus,
under this section a state could be subject to actions in federal
court just like any other private or governmental party.
I

2.

The citizen suit provision

In addition to the inclusion of states as potentially liable
parties, SARA's provision for citizen's suits represents a formidable attack on state sovereign immunity. It is one thing to
allow the federal government to take legal action against states
for violations of federal law under CERCLA;61 it is quite another to allow private citizens to sue the state in direct contradiction to the express provision of the Eleventh Amendment
and the Court's pronouncement in Hans.
The failure to provide for citizen's suits for contribution
was considered to be one of the great deficiencies in the original CERCLA statute. 62 The SARA amendments attempted to

58.
42 u.s.c. § 9601(20)(D).
59.
!d.
60.
ld. (emphasis added).
61.
The nature of federalism and the preemptive powers of the national sovereign demand that at least the federal government have the power to initiate
judicial action against a state in federal court.
62.
Floyd, supra note 42.
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remedy this by enacting section 310. 63 Section 310 provides
that any person may commence a citizen's suit "against any
person (including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted by the
Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution) . . . in violation of
any . . . regulation."64 It is interesting to note that the clause
which most clearly abrogates the Eleventh Amendment cites
the amendment as its only limitation.
As yet, it is unclear how section 310 will be interpreted by
the courts, but it can only be understood if the reference to the
Eleventh Amendment is viewed as only applying to this section
and not to suits by persons provided for by other sections of
CERCLA. Some argue that section 310 is limited to suits for
injunctive relief only, but the fact that the Eleventh Amendment is invoked in this section and not in the others is evidence that Congress considered the Eleventh Amendment as
having been abrogated by the other provisions of CERCLA.
Thus, Congress felt it necessary to invoke it as a limit to this
section only. 65
IV. PENNSYLVANIA V.

UNION

GAS Co.

A. Facts
In 1980, the EPA and the State of Pennsylvania began
efforts to clean up what became the first emergency Superfund
site listed in the United States under the CERCLA guidelines.66 For nearly 50 years the predecessors of Union Gas67
operated a coal gasification plant near Brodhead Creek in
Straudsberg, Pennsylvania. 68 As a byproduct of its main operations the plant produced large amounts of coal tar which were
deposited on top of, and injected into, the soil surrounding the
plant. 69

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

42 U.S.C. § 9659.
ld. (emphasis added).
Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 10.
ld. at 5.
Union Gas Co. acquired the property by merger in 1978. Note, Look Out
States . . . Your Environmental Liability Could Be Bigger than You Think, 30
NAT. RESOURCES J. 929 (1990).
ld.
68.
69.
ld. The predecessor plant's use of in-ground disposal of coal tar was considered state-of-the-art technology of that time. Respondent's Brief in Opposition to
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct 2273
(1989) (No. 87-1241).
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Years after the plant shut down and the property had
changed hands, the State of Pennsylvania, together with the
Borough of Stroudsburg and the Army Corps of Engineers,
began excavating on the property as part of a flood control
project along Brodhead Creek. 70 While excavating, the state
disturbed the deposits of coal tar causing them to seep into
Brodhead Creek. 71 Upon notification of the seepage, the EPA
declared the coal tar a hazardous substance 72 and ordered
that the site be cleaned. 73
The state and federal government
completed cleanup of the Broadhead Creek site at a final cost
of $1.4 million. 74 Eventually, the United States reimbursed
Pennsylvania for the federal share of the cleanup expenses.
The United States then filed a lawsuit against Union Gas to
recover its expenditures pursuant to sections 104 and 106 of
CERCLA. 75 as well as other environmental statutes. 76 Union
Gas, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against the State of
Pennsylvania, ~laiming that the state was liable as an "owner
or operator" under CERCLA. 77 The district court dismissed
the claim against Pennsylvania based on the bar of Eleventh
Amendment immunity. 78 The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Supreme
Court vacated the decision and remanded the case for consideration in light of the new SARA amendments which Congress
had passed while the parties waited for the Supreme Court to
grant certiorari. 79
Upon remand, the Third Circuit held that in light of the
new SARA amendments, the states had been made liable to
private parties in suits under CERCLA and the SARA
amendments created an unambiguous abrogation of state sovereign immunity granted by the Eleventh Amendment. In a
plurality decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit decision. 80

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

United States v. Union Gas, 792 F.2d 372, 374 (3d Cir. 1986).
ld.
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(14).
United States v. Union Gas, 792 F.2d 372, 374 (3d Cir. 1986).
ld. at 375.
42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606.
Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 6.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 6.
Id.
ld.
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B. Analysis
The decision in Union Gas was very fragmented with the
Court issuing five different opinions. The judgment of the
Court was announced by Justice Brennan who was joined by
Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens. According to Justice
Brennan, there were two questions necessary for the Court to
decide: (1) "whether CERCLA, as amended by SARA, clearly
expresses an intent to hold States liable in damages for conduct
described in the statute"; 81 and (2) "whether Congress possesses the . . . power of abrogation under the Commerce
Clause ...."82
1.

Brennan's opinion

In his decision on the abrogation question, Brennan presented a three-pronged argument that began with an analysis
of CERCLA's definitions of "persons" and "owners or operators"
as well as the exclusion for states in certain situations. He
came to the conclusion that:
The express inclusion of States within the statute's definition
of "persons," and the plain statement that States are to be
considered "owners or operators" in all but very narrow circumstances, together convey a message of unmistakable clarity: Congress intended that States be liable al6ng with everyone else for cleanup costs recoverable under CERCLA. 83

Further, Brennan recognized that although the statute allows
for express exclusions of states as potentially liable parties in
certain circumstances, the only express exclusion, section
101(20)(D), did not apply under the circumstances of the
case. 84
Brennan next turned to several sections in the statute that
indirectly support the notion that Congress intended that
states be held liable under CERCLA. According to Brennan, the
fact that Congress supplied an exception to a state's general
liability under sections 101(20)(D) and 107(d)(2) was "explicit
recognition of the potential liability of States under this stat-

81.
82.

!d. at 5.
!d.

83.
84.

!d.

Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 8.
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ute .... "85 In other words, if states were not already liable
under other CERCLA provisions, there would be no need for
the specific exemptions.
Brennan's third argument was that "in § 101(20)(D), Congress used language virtually identical to that it chose in waiving the Federal Government's immunity from suits for damages
under CERCLA."86 This mirroring of the "unequivocal expression" of the waiver of federal sovereign immunity with that of
the states was further evidence of a congressional intention to
override state immunity. 87 Thus, the language of the waiver of
the United States sovereign immunity became the language of
abrogation of state sovereign immunity.
Brennan's response to the question whether Congress actually has power, under the Commerce Clause to abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment was little more than a restatement of a
long line of cases decided by the Court recognizing that power.88 Brennan answers that "every Court of Appeals to have
reached this issue has concluded that Congress has the authority to abrogate States' immunity from suit when legislating
pursuant to the plenary powers granted it by the Constitution."89 In this case, it was the familiar power of the Commerce Clause.

2.

Stevens' concurring opinion

Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, gave a scathing
reply to the conventionalist view of the Eleventh Amendment
expressed in Hans. 90 According to his belief, Hans was wrongly decided, and the Eleventh Amendment has never embodied a
general grant of sovereign immunity to the states. 91 Therefore, there is no need to find, nor indeed, can there be any
abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment. The prohibition
against a state's own citizens suing it in federal court was

85.
!d.
86.
!d. at 10; see 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1).
87.
Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1.
88.
See Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Alabama Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184 (1964);
Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Pub. Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 286 (1973);
Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Pub. Trans., 483 U.S. 468, 475-76 (1987);
County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation for New York State, 470 U.S. 226, 252
(1985); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985).
89.
Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 15.
90.
!d. at 23.
!d. at 23-25.
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merely a judge-made rule and can be undone by judges without
reference to the Eleventh Amendment. 92 This, of course, is the
unadulterated revisionist view of the Eleventh Amendment.

3. White's dissent
Justice White wrote the dissenting opinion in Union Gas.
In the first part White concluded that there was no "unmistakably clear language" in CERCLA or SARA to override the Eleventh Amendment. 93 White drew support for his opinion from
the fact that many of the appellate courts found that the
CERCLA provisions cited by Brennan did not express a clear
abrogation of state immunity. 94 It stands to reason that if so
many judges were mistaken on that issue then the declarations
in CERCLA involving the Eleventh Amendment could not be
"unmistakable".
White bases his second argument on the fact that Congress
also included the United States in its definition of the term
"person," yet found it necessary to include a separate section
detailing the waiver of immunity for the federal government. 95
If the inclusion of the United States in the definition of the
term "person" was enough to waive sovereign immunity, why
was the additional provision necessary? The fact that there was
no like provision in CERCLA detailing the abrogation of state
immunity is evidence that there was no such intent on the part
of Congress. 96
White's third argument was simply that any authority
given by CERCLA over the states relates
, only to actions
brought by the federal government and not to those brought by
private citizens. 97 Concerning the language of CERCLA, White
was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor
and Kennedy. With the balance of White's dissent these justices concurred in part and dissented in part.
In the second half of White's dissent, he agreed with
Brennan that Congress has the power under the Commerce
Clause to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment, though he disagreed with Brennan's reasoning. Justice Scalia filed a sepa-
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rate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. He too,
was joined in part by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy.
The mishmash of opinions in Union Gas is indicative of the
state of the doctrine of state sovereign immunity in the Court
today. The decision was a victory for the revisionists, but is it a
firm, lasting victory?
C.

The Effects of Union Gas

The most immediate and significant effect of the decision
in Union Gas was the unrestrained introduction of broad liability for states under CERCLA and perhaps other environmental
statutes. Of course, the decision has similar implications for
other potentially liable parties. According to Brennan, "everyone who is potentially responsible for hazardous-waste contamination may be forced to contribute to the costs of cleanup."98
According to Stevens, "Congress has decided that the federal
interest in protecting the environment outweighs any countervailing interest in not subjecting States to the possible award of
monetary damages in a federal court."99
In the process of giving expanded authority under the
CERCLA statute, the Eleventh Amendment may have lost a
great deal of its significance except as an historical artifact.
Although the holding in Hans was not specifically overturned
and the Eleventh Amendment was not attacked head-on, the
Union Gas decision represented an end-run around the sovereign immunity doctrine. With Union Gas, the Court expanded
the authority of Congress to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment, negating any further need for direct attacks on the
amendment.
In the process of dodging the Eleventh Amendment, recent
Court interpretations of CERCLA may have become too difficult for states to bear. States are not like most entities. They
are funded through taxes, by people who generally have little
control over how their bureaucracy functions and how their
money is spent. It is this position of the states that encouraged
Congress to adopt the Eleventh Amendment and the Supreme
Court to create the doctrine in Hans. These efforts have now
been thwarted in the effort to remedy what is considered to be

98.
99.

!d. at 21.
Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 28 (emphasis added).
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an immediate and serious threat to the environment.
The Union Gas decision has been closely followed in almost
every federal circuit. However, the ultimate position of the
Court (in light of its recent move toward the right) may change.
Union Gas does not represent a solid backing of a majority
within the Court and could be resting on shaky ground. A more
solid position of the Court may emerge within the next several
years.
V.

CONCLUSION

Due to the increasing awareness of the imminent dangers
to the environment in which we live, Congress has passed increasingly restrictive environmental statutes which have rekindled old conflicts about the meaning and scope of the Eleventh
Amendment and the doctrine of state sovereign immunity. In
the most recent round in that battle, the Supreme Court held
that CERCLA, as amended by SARA, evidences a clear intent
by Congress to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment and allow
citizen suits against states found in violation of the statute. In
doing so, the Court signaled a victory for the revisionist faction
in the battle over the Eleventh Amendment and has curbed the
effectiveness of the Hans decision as a protection of states
immunity. The victory for the revisionists may be short lived in
light of the splintered opinion of the Court in Union Gas. A
majority of the Court has yet to solidify a more secure position
on the Eleventh Amendment issue, and there is still hope that
the states may not lose the few vestiges of sovereignty they
have retained.
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